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RELIEF SOUGHT ON ^PPEAL 
Gleave seeks to have the| jury verdict upheld. 
However
 f Gleave seeks to have the case remanded for two 
issues: 
A. To award prejudgment interest 
on loss of earning capacity. 
B. For a trial on the limited issue 
of punitive damages. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Gleave does not agree with the Statement of Facts 
in Rio Grande's brief• Gleave's version of the facts will 
be set forth in the sections below: 
2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
AT POINT I, 
Rio Grande claims th^t the evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict. 
However, the evidence shows that this is an 
extremely hazardous crossing because the motorist cannot see 
an oncoming train until about four seconds before impact. 
The evidence further shows that Gieave took all of the 
prudent precautions in crossing the tracks. On the other 
hand, Rio Grande took no steps to injure safety. 
AT POINT II. 
Rio Grande claims that one of the jurors (Argyle) 
should have been excused because she was acquainted with 
Gieave's doctor. 
However, we have only a pa|rtial transcript of the 
voir dire proceedings. In the absence of a complete record, 
this Court should affirm the trial cd>urt. 
AT POINT III^ 
Rio Grande claims that the trial court erred by 
failing to grant a motion for partial summary judgment in 
the pre-trial proceedings. 
3 
However, during the trial, the judge reversed his 
earlier position and gave Rio Grande everything it wanted 
under the original summary judgment theory. Thus, this 
issue is moot. 
AT POINT IV. 
Rio Grande claims error because of comments in 
closing argument with respect to witness Woodard. 
However, Rio Grande did not correctly preserve 
that issue in the trial court. Therefore, it is waived. 
AT POINT V. 
Rio Grande claims error because the trial court 
failed to give a seat belt instruction. 
However, there was no expert evidence to support 
such an instruction. Therefore, the ruling was correct. 
AT POINT VI. 
(GLEAVEfS CROSS APPEAL) 
The jury awarded Gleave $275,000.00 for lost 
earning capacity. Gleave has a statutory right to 
prejudgment interest on that amount. The trial court erred 
by failing to allow such prejudgment interest. 
4 
AT POINT VII ,| 
(CLEAVE1 S CROSS APPEAL,) 
Cleave cl^irr^ error because t:.e ::.. 
refused *- • instruct * u -^ ^irv ::~ ouni|ti\^ .^.inace? ; ^ ideroe 
a t ":.. - "w as 
danger cue- intersection. However, Rio Grande tno* ^osr. jte.x 
uve m e safety of the crossing, 
bieav- .anus \.^a^ -u*. 3 conscious disregaid t ;t [JUJ:I I J c: 
safety will su^^o^t ^jnit-ve damages4 
AT POINT "V Ill, 
Pic Grandp claims that" •=> ^ e w . : ^ki j Q n e c e s s a r < } 
a] loca+e f^r * ^i-^- r ^ * n Grann :ru the: S^a:^ * ~J 
Perhaps • 1 
contribution soit.v between P - Grande ire * - * *- <^ f 
111 a In, • ~ * c x b *^~ *- * r^ l,+~ *. * n 
100% u . i. 1. c- > w e r ; ciga . .s t . - - G r a n d e 1. , ~<iv_r -
1 
^ paid, Rio Grande can si le the State of Utah for 
5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE IS ABUNDANT EVIDENCE FROM 
WHICH A JURY COULD CONCLUDE THAT 
RIO GRANDE WAS 100% NEGLIGENT. 
Rio Grande's first issue is an attack on the 
evidence. Rio Grande argues that Gleave was negligent as a 
matter of law. In the alternative, Rio Grande argues that 
there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict. (See 
Brief of Appellants, at Point One.) 
In support of this issue, Rio Grande resorts to 
jury argument. Rio Grande chooses favorable evidence. Rio 
Grande ignores unfavorable evidence. 
However, on appeal, this Court should not weigh 
conflicting evidence. This Court should simply determine if 
there is competent evidence in the record to support the 
jury verdict. In making that analysis, the Court should 
construe all inferences in favor of the jury's verdict. 
See, e.g., Stanger v. Sentinel Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201 
(Utah 1983). 
A. The Evidence Shows That The Railroad Crossing is a 
Trap for Motorists. 
One expert (Mitchell) was in charge of all 
railroad crossings in Pennsylvania. He testified that in 
all of his experience, he had only seen three other 
6 
crossings as hazardous as the crossing in this case, 
(R. 1730. ) A second expert (Van Wagone" 1 •* a?ff:^d that i t 
was the most . sngerous ^rossina hp * . after 
looking at thousands of crossings. • f-. , ~~ • 
I 
the stop sign can sen ci iy abou1 ,-6;* :eeK • - *•* y">rth. 
(E , 16 ' ) By wa^ 01 comparison, Mcnta"* '**4 * -'<;.: 
(1947) jctuies . ->,-, m a as hazardous . ...-A*-
away from the crospjno cio^ -- re*- ha-e an urobst ruct^n ** -^  r 
a !:  .- ::)i ICE 
requires a rai.rcad tc m a m t a : • rossing ?" t-a* 'r r..*rists 
I t r 1 1 «r*tec:i i r:i ew foi: 30u letn. 
An t -. - T*V.I i o g i c t 'Erey) t e s t : : i e - ' . he 
t r a i n w r , c f ' D r5 * ~nf r-i r i e r*- w a r n i n g ~ dance r 
u n t i 1 t . i I In i in I ij i set I luit , 
( V » Or * • r o - ' .-* t r a i n w h i s t l e would n o t 
^ - B bp fore t h e t r a i n h i t s 
t h e _> - ? r ? e c t i o n . (See pjct^in. . . . x h i b i t j b , , ! The r e a s o n 
f O ^ *-^ ^ r V ^ n ^ r n i . - r J • ,1 | i | f f t e S O I l F l d i ' t t h e 
V 1 _ " " • - r * II , I 1 I ( I | | I I I 1 I I I I 1 1 1 M i l l I I
 ( 
the curving track, etc -
T7 . • • c ' "* * • t: f * a expert (Van W.* :rrer ) 
testii--.; -ha4 * . L^^^IL^ '' <= a trap ^n 
Wagoner explained that a motorist can't see the train until 
-
1
""'' E^ ren i£ there was no problem with ai idibility, the train 
engineer had no specific recollection of even blowing the 
whistle until he actually saw the car as the train rounded 
the bend, (R , 1401-1402.) That would be about 3 - 4 seconds 
before impact,, (See plaintiff 1 s Exhibi t No. 47 ) 
; 
about four seconds before impact. (R. 1609-1610.) According 
to Van Wagoner, that doesn't give a motorist enough time to 
get across the tracks. On the other hand, that doesn't give 
the motorist enough time to stop his vehicle. Thus, the 
motorist is in a trap. (R. 1588-R. 1593): 
Q. Just to be clear, you said the 
probability of an impact is one. 
By that do you mean one hundred 
percent? 
A. It is a certainty . . . there is no 
way that a driver can avoid a 
collision. 
(R. 1593.) 
* * * 
A* Because there is a zone which I 
have shown on the diagrams that if 
we put a train coming in that zone 
at the speeds they travel there, 
there is certainty that a collision 
will occur when a driver is acting 
in a prudent way by stopping at a 
traffic control device and looking 
down the track . 
(R. 1606.) . • <» 
In summary, there was substantial evidence that 
the railroad crossing is a trap for motorists. The jury was 
entitled to reach a conclusion that Gleave was 0% 
negligent—and that Rio Grande was 100% negligent. 
B. The Evidence Shows That Gleave Met His Duty. 
Gleave had a duty of due care. The evidence shows 
that he fully met that duty: 
8 
Gleave approached the crossing and stopped, at the 
) 
c *- T .- • -• , • - 17 5 8, ) " After stopping , he 
1 o o k e c •_ v, *:: . ]! 3 I i s t a s h e s t a r t e d f o r w a r d , 
h^ I O O W P H - riaht 1760.) Gleave had tc: • move 
s ; • • • • f t h € • :: o n d :i t :i o i I :> f t: 1 i <s !:  :i : a c k s 
* 3, ; " *- - * looked back, t o t h e 1 e f t a i id f<: r t h e 
f L ' J : 1 7 6 0 . ) G l e a v e d i d n o t h e a r 
t h e w n ^ i . - i. i . * .%fcti bacl i: t o t h e l e f t t o s e e t h e 
t r a i n c^^ ^ ^ f i K - ^ •- -n^ , (R, 11 7 5 0 . ) Gl e a v e immed i a t e l y 
t - -j- r- tl le f::li m e 1 l B z- : i i l ::i :j a t t'i: i E; • : a r 
stopped, h:.« • - . • J I - aboi it 1 foot from, the tracks, 
t r i e d t o g e t 11 l e c a r i n t o 
r e v e r s e . But he was h i t b e f o r e he c o u l d b a c k u p . (R. 1 ; 6 5 . ) 
In s h o r t , G3 e a v e s t o p p e d ,r 1 ooked b o t h ways , 
l i s t e n e d c i I I ]::: i: :N zee .• fled sJ o ; ; Il } Tl le ji ill :: ] • ::: • :: "i :i Il ::i € -a s i ] y 
c o n c l u d e t h a t G l e a v e :i::i • I = • e r y t h i n g t h a t a r e a s o n a b l e , 
I I  I l e : 
R io Grande r e s p o n d s t o a l ] of t l i i s by s a y i n g t h a t 
G l e a v e hac - -1' * - • s t o p t w i c e . Once a t t h e s t o p s i g n — a n d 
a ^ o . c t I .1 i€ I ' .1 u: esl: IC II • 3 ::: f 1 .1 :n = !:::ii: acks • I ! il : > 
Grand*, says a motorist can get across the tracks safely by 
, ief of Appel lant, at p. j. u. 
GOmpdi *-* -o :~ rv. b . 
— Rio Gra nde repeatedly argue & .i^ -, 
policeman that he slowed but did not stop for the stop sign. 
(Brief of Appellant, at pp. 1 0 a: :- . .- sufficient to 
say that the ]ury rejected that version of the evidence. 
At trial, Gleave testified that he did stop. There was also 
an independent witness who saw the accident and corroborated 
Mr," Gleave 1s testimony that Gleave did stop. (P 1 813-1814.) 
9 
The short answer is simply that the jury rejected this 
version of the evidence. The jury believed plaintiff's 
expert (Van Wagoner) who testified that it is impossible for 
a car to cross the tracks safely (see above). 
Furthermore, Van Wagoner testified that the 
presence of the existing stop sign violates driver 
expectancies. In other words, a driver who stops at the 
stop sign, expects that it is then safe to proceed across 
the tracks without making any further stops. (R. 1588-1589, 
1606.) 
In summary, it was entirely reasonable for Gleave 
to stop once at at the stop sign. If someone wanted him to 
stop twice, they should have put in two stop signs. 
C. Evidence of Rio Grande's Breach of Duty. 
Rio Grande's brief bristles with argument about 
Gleave's duty. Rio Grande argues that Gleave has a duty to 
stop, look, listen, etc. We concede that a motorist does 
have such duties—and the jury was so instructed. (R. 733, 
738, 740, 741, 743.) 
However, Pio Grande also has a duty of due care. 
Rio Grande's duty of due care includes inter alia, the 
following: 
First, Rio Grande had a duty to remove weeds which 
interfered with vision. See, e.g., Lowery v. Seabord 
Coastline R.R. Co., 241 S.E.2d 158 (S.C. 1978). Compare 
R. 735 and § 41-6-19, Utah Code Ann. 
10 
Second, Ri o Grande had a duty to tnVp ^xtra 
precaution?- '^--hazardous crossing. See, " ^ 2 -
Hobbs v. Denvei ^ .-, uranae western r ..-
(Utah 1984). (Compare R. "V-«t 
r
 . i I "I i in 'I1, i I p £ r i j ' , ^ t j _ i +•_ 111 -i !• r p j n 
at a reasoriaon- speer. :jet
 11;'l,-' Denkers v. Southern 
Pac. Cc , : J. r. - * - r 1918)? St. Louis B,R. Co, 
v, Penningtons M, (Ai I' 1 '* "' 7) ; Runkle v. 
Burlington Northern, •• • P. 2d 982,, 990 (Mont, 1980). 
Compar e P 7 12 . 
There ! - evidence that Rio Grande burned weeds, 
iheie is> ii o-'ifl^p-.- that Rio Grande reduced the 
s peed :i £ i t s train s (I !: II 5 9 9 ) Ther e i s no ev idence tha t 
P i o G r and e d i d a ny t h i ng a t a 11 !: :: • a vo i d t h I s ace i d e n t, 
(I »: Il 33 3 I! 3 3 1 1 33 8 ) Indeed, 1 .he ei lgd i leer da • :! i I :: • t av en 
apply the brakes until after he hi t the car,, (R , ] 410-
1N 1 I ,1 Hnncp, the jur ] • was completely justified in finding 
that Riu Grande w a c L00% i legligent, 
POINT II. 
RIO GRANDE fS CLAIMS OF 
AN IRREGULARITY IN THE 
JURY SELECTION ARE PURE 
CONJECTURE, 
I i II I I i ' i diu l c i ( i i i i i i | | I i l l I I I 1 1 1 1 | mi i i in '. i q I r was a 
p a t i e n t of m^ i i t IH-« ^ i l l n e s s e s ( G l e a ^ t - ' s t r e a t i n g d o c t o r ) , . 
3/ 
—• Denver \ * Granae wtssu^i:- r^iiroad Company seu& * u^ 
own speed , *M . There are no municipal regulations or 
state statute ,„et train speed. (R. 1316 and 
P 
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Ric Grande claims that bias, therefore, crept into the jury 
selection process. Specifically, Rio Grande claims that the 
jury was not introduced to Dr. Mendenhall during the voir 
dire. (Brief of Appellant, Point II.) 
In support thereof, Rio Grande cites a portion of 
the reporter's transcript of the voir dire. However, the 
problem is that the court reporter only transcribed a small 
portion of those proceedings. (R. 1672.) Thereafter, 
Dr. Mendenhall1 s name was presented to the jury in the 
unreported portion of the voir dire proceedings. (R. 2037-
2038.) This portion of the Record is included here as 
Exhibit A. 
Where the Record is not complete, it is uniformly 
held that the judgment below shouLd be affirmed. First 
Federal Savings & Loan v. Schamanek, 684 P. 2d 1257 (Utah 
1984); Bevan v. J.H. Const. Co., 669 P.2d 442 (Utah 1983); 
Rutter v. McLaughlin, 612 P.2d 135 (Idaho 1980). 
Gleave submits that the procedural flaw is fatal. 
However, this Court might be inclined to look beyond the 
procedural flaw. Therefore, Gleave has briefed the merits 
of the issue. Since those arguments are only of peripheral 
interest, and since they are not necessary to decide this 
appeal, they are contained in a separate appendix. (See 
Exhibit B.) 
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POINT III. 
AN Y ERROR IN THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RULINGS IS MOOT BECAUSE THE TRIAL 
COURT REVERSED ITS POSITION AT 
TRIAI ,. 
R i o Grai ide mo ve :i f :: :i : : summar y jiidg n t.ei i !:: pr :ii < :):t:: i :• : 
trial Its theory was that State government had exclusive 
j .. . - . it, (preemptd on) :i) ? ei: t::l: ie s i gi is a i i ::i s:i iina] s a t: 
railroad cro s s ings . The tr I a ] :::ourt den ied the motion, 
Rio Grande now c 1 ai ms that the r i il ing 01 i summary judgment 
requires a new ti: ial See Brief of Appellant
 f a t I 'C ii i i: 111., 
However, any error in the rul I ng on summary 
j . . - * »• :: t: A t t:::i: ::i a ] , t I: :i = j t ldge i: ei re i: sed I: :i :i s ea r J :i ei: 
positi c: i€ summary judgment issues• Specificall y , the 
judge instructed the jury thati 
Under U tal i ] aw the • :i Itimate 
determination regarding right c f way and 
crossing design and crossing warning and 
safety devices i s placed under the 
control of the Utah Department of 
Transportation. You may not therefore 
find either defendant railroad negligent 
based upon any defects which might exist 
with respect to the design, of the 
1600' South crossing or based upon any 
problems you may perceive in the lack of 
traffic warning device|s at the 
1600 South crossing . 
(If 7 3 7 j 
I n -mid i ! 11 ii I i i I In I ( i,' e e | U I m . | i n s I i i.u "I i i i n • , I i 
Grande made a motion for a directed verdict on the very same 
issue. (R. 1069) . The trial court granted that motion. 
(R. 1073-1074.) Specifically, the trial court ruled that: 
Well, the Court has ruled and is 
going to rule that with respect to the 
ultimate obligation of putting safety 
devices, whether it be stop signs, 
flashers, whatever that the ultimate 
responsibility for that lies with the 
Department of Transportation. 
(R. 1073.) 
Thus, there can be no error because Rio Grande got 
everything it wanted. The only difference is that the 
rulings came at a later stage of the trial. Instead of 
granting the summary judgment, the judge gave the same 
identical law in the form of jury instructions and a 
directed verdict. 
Therefore, we believe that it is not necessary for 
this Court to rule on the merits of the summary judgment 
rulings. Nevertheless, this Court might be inclined to 
inquire into the merits of the summary judgment ruling. 
Therefore, Gleave has prepared a response to the substance 
of those arguments. Since those arguments are only of 
peripheral interest, and since they may not be necessary to 
decide this appeal, they are contained in a separate 
appendix. (See Exhibit C.) 
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POINT IV. 
ANY ERROR RELATING TO 
WOODARD'S TESTIMONY HAS 
BEEN WAIVED. 
A. Any Error in Receiving the Evidence was Waived. 
The story of Willis Wcoda|rd is a strange saga. 
However, it is really a "sideshow" that doesn't affect the 
trial in one way or another. 
Woodard was in the engine when the train hit 
Gleave. (R. 1779.) However, Woodarcft wasn't looking, so he 
didn't actually see the collision. (R. 1779-1780.) 
Nevertheless, he was a direct witneiss to some surrounding 
circumstances such as blowing the whistle, (R. 1781-1782); 
4 
how hard the brakes were set, (R. 178| 1) ; stopping distance, 
(R. 1782); and certain conversation$ with Gleave after the 
accident, (R. 1784-1787) . 
Gleave called Woodard as la witness. During the 
direct examination, Rio Grande made a motion to terminate 
further examination of Woodard. Gleave vigorously objected. 
However, the court granted Rio Grange's motion and excused 
Woodard. (R. 1801 and 1807-1808.) 
It is crucial to note that Rio Grande did not move 
to strike Woodard's testimony. Nor,, did the court strike 
the testimony. The court's specific ruling was that: 
— An expert might compute spepd based on stopping 
distance. 
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I am going to preclude any further 
testimony by this witness, Mr. DeBry. 
(R. 1808, emphasis added.) 
For purposes of this appeal, it is not necessary 
5 to decide whether the judge's ruling was correct. No 
objection was made to the evidence after it was received. 
Rio Grande's only objection was to excuse the witness before 
he testified further. No motion to strike the testimony was 
made. Cf. Scott v. Scott, 430 P.2d 580, 19 Utah 2d 267 
(Utah 1967). Thus, Rio Grande got exactly what it asked 
for. 
— Rio Grande's reason for seeking to terminate the 
examination was unique. Rio Grande claimed that Woodard (an 
eyewitness) should not be able to testify because he had in 
some respects changed his story. (See entire colloquy at R. 
1788-1804.) However, Rio Grande has offered no authority 
for that unusual position. The purpose of a trial is to get 
to the truth; a trial is cloaked with various safeguards to 
promote that end; e.g., the jury, the oath, cross-examination, 
etc. We find no case in anglo-saxon jurisprudence where a 
witness has been prevented from testifying because his 
veracity was in question. Rather the reverse is true. If 
his veracity is in question., you haves a trial. 
Rio Grande points to an exchange of letters between 
Woodard and the Rio Grande attorney. (Exhibit N to Brief of 
Appellant.) Rio Grande argues that Woodard was likely to 
perjure himself. That is mere speculation. It is just as 
likely that Exhibit N was Woodard's way of saying that he 
was finally ready to tell the truth. 
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B. Any Error in Arguing the Evidence was Waived. 
Rio Grande complains that Gleave should rot have 
commented on Woodard's testimony in iclosing argument. Here 
is the disputed argument: 
I will just Very briefly 
mention a comment on a couple of things 
Mr. Richman said; that Mr. IBurton didn't 
recall blowing the whistle. That is 
true. He forgot Mr. Woodard. Remember 
Mr. Woodard said—what is 4- quarter of a 
mile in yards? Mr. Woqdard said—I 
said, 'When did he blow the whistle?' 
And he said, fl think three hundred 
yards.' And I said, 'Coulg it have been 
as short as two hundred ydrds?' And he 
said, 'Yes, maybe two hundred yards.' 
And that is less than a quarter of a 
mile. 
(R. 1151-1152.) 
If Rio Grande did not like that comment, it should 
have immediately objected. If the Objection was valid, the 
Court could have made a curative instruction. Rio Grande 
did not object. It did not move fori a mistrial. Thus, the 
alleged error is waived. Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Lloyd 
W. Keller Corp., 392 P.2d 620, 15 Utah 2d 318 (Utah 1964); 
Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980); Sanders v. 
Cassity, 586 P.2d 423 (Utah 1978). 
C. Woodard's Testimony was not Necessary to the Verdict. 
Finally, the jury could have reached the same 
conclusion with or without Woodard's testimony. According 
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to the expert audiologist, it wouldn't matter how far back 
the whistle had sounded. The vegetation and terrain soak up 
the sound. (R. 1460.). Therefore, the sound would not be 
loud enough to serve as a warning until about 3 seconds 
before impact. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 35.) At that 
point, it is too late for the driver to take evasive action. 
(R. 1593.) 
Thus, the testimony of Woodard (about when the 
whistle was sounded) is not necessary to the verdict. The 
jury verdict can be fully supported on the basis of the 
audiologist1s expert testimony which reached the same 
result. Since the verdict can be sustained on other 
grounds, there is no reversible error. See, Miller v. 
Golden Motel, 428 P.2d 655 (N.M. 1967). Cf. Wheeler v. 
Jones, 431 P.2d 985, 19 Utah 2d 392 (Utah 1967). 
POINT V. 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE IN THE 
RECORD TO SUPPORT A SEAT BELT 
INSTRUCTION. 
At trial, Rio Grande asked for a seat belt 
instruction. Specifically, Rio Grande wanted an instruction 
that failure to use a seat belt could be considered on 
mitigation of damages. The trial court refused to give the 
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instruction. Rio Grande appeals froin that refusal. (Brief 
of Appellant, at Point V.) 
A. The Law in Other Jurisdictions. 
A rather lively debate is raging around the 
country with respect to these seat belt instructions. A 
clear majority of the jurisdictions jrefuse to give the seat 
belt instruction. See, e.g.: 
Lafferty v. Allstate Insurance Co., 425 So.2d 
1147 (Fla. App. 1982); 
Polyard v. Terry, 372 A.2d 
Talpin v. Clark, 626 P.2d 1: 
Britton v. Doehring, 242 So-.2d 666 (Ala. 1970); 
Nash v. Kamrath, 521 P.2d 4 
Fischer v. MooTe, 517 P.2d 
Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. 1967); 
McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 
Hampton v. State Hwy. CommJ 
.W.2d 606 (Mich. 1969) ; 
(Kan. 1972); 
Ramankewitz v. Black, 167 It 
Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.id 293 (Mo. 1970); 
Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 544 P.2d 
719 (N.M. 1975); 
Miller v. Miller, 160 S.E.2d 65 (N.C. 1968); 
Roberts v. Bohn, 269 N.E.2d 53, Revd. on other 
grounds 279 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio 1971); 
Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 
492 P.2d 1030 
48 (Okla. 1976); 
Stallcup v. Taylor, 463 S.W.2d 416 (Tenn. 1978); 
Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., *~~ ~ ~"
(Wash 1972); 
Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 
Thomas V.Hev>sor) ^ q s P - ^ 
378 (N.J. 1977); 
198 (Kan. 1981); 
61 (Ariz. 1974); 
458 (Colo. 1973); 
20 (D.C. App. 1976); 
498 P.2d 236 
S.W.2d 116 (Tex. 1974) . 
41 <?(jM. Kei.Ws). 
However, a minority of jurisdictions have reached 
the opposite conclusion. 
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Seey e.g.; 
Hale v. Cravens, 263 N,E.2d 593 (111. App. 1970); 
Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164 (1974); 
Jones v. Daguef 166 S.E.2d 99 (S.C. 1969) (By 
implication). 
B. Utah Case Law on the Seat Belt Issue. 
This issue has never been squarely considered in 
Utah. Rio Grande relies solely on Acculog Inc. v. Peterson, 
692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984). However, Acculog has nothing at 
all to do with the seat belt instruction. Presumably, Rio 
g 
Grande refers to a footnote in the case. However, that 
— The entire text of the footnote in the concurring 
opinion is as follows: 
Assume: X driving a car, and Y, driving a 
motorcycle, get in an accident. Y is not wearing 
a helmet. The jury finds X is 60 percent liable 
for causing the accident [the "injury" under § 
78-27-37] making Y, the motorcyclist, 40 percent 
liable for causing the accident. The jury also 
finds Y would have avoided 60 percent of his 
injuries [damages] if he had worn a helmet; X is 
40 percent liable for causing Y's [damages]. Y 
proves $100,000 in damages. On the basis of these 
findings, the $100,000 award should be reduced by 
40 percent, which accounts for Y's contributing to 
the cause of the accident. Hence, the award is 
diminished to $60,000. 
The $60,000 should now be reduced to the extent 
that Y's [damages] would have been [avoided] had 
he worn a helmet, i.e., 60 percent. This 
adjustment leaves a total award of $24,000. 
Acculog Inc., at 121-122, n. 2. 
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footnote was a concurring opinion by a single justice. 
Therefore, that single footnote doe^ not establish the law 
of this jurisdiction. 
C, The Requirement for Expert Testimony. 
In this case, it is not nectessary for the Court to 
adopt—or reject—the seat belt instruction. The trial 
court judge properly refused the instruction because there 
was no expert evidence to support the instruction. 
Those few jurisdictions which adopt the seat belt 
instruction always require expert testimony. Indeed, a 
major argument against the seat b£lt issue is that it, 
" . . . would lead to a veritable bjattle of experts as to 
what injuries would or would not ha^e been avoided had the 
plaintiff been wearing a belt." Aitiend v. Bell, 570 P. 2d 
138, 143 (Wash. 1977); Compare R^le 702, Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
In Truman v. Vargas, 275 C4I. App. 2d 976, 80 Cal. 
Rptr. 373 (1969) , the court ruled tljiat, " . . . it was not 
for the nonexpert minds to determine what the consequences 
to Truman would have been if he had fyeen using a seat belt." 
80 Cal. Rptr. at 377. 
In Barry v. Coca Cola Cd. , 239 A.2d 273 (N.J. 
1967) , the court held that failurje to introduce expert 
testimony on the seat belt issue wou^d result in the "purest 
kind of speculation." 239 A.2d at 2^6. 
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In Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 1974), 
the court adopted the seat belt defense. Nevertheless, the 
court specifically required the use of expert testimony. 
See also: Foley v. City of West Allis, 335 N.W.2d 824, 831 
( w i s . I Q R 3 ) * J Wassett v»> Ha<wV>l\vi
 x 
^ 3 A, 2d 010(cow*. W&S). 
D. Rio Grande's Failure to Produce an Expert. 
The seat belt issue is an affirmative defense. 
Thus, Rio Grande has the burden of proof issue. Spier v. 
Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167 (N.Y. 1974). Pratt v. Board of 
Education of Uintah School Dist., 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977). 
Compare Rule 12(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rio Grande relies on very sketchy evidence to 
support its seat belt theory. See Brief of Appellant at 
p. 41. However, Rio Grande offered no expert testimony at 
all to support its seat belt theory. 
Gleave anticipates that Rio Grande will claim that 
the treating doctor (Mendenhall) was an expert and that his 
testimony would satisfy the requirement for expert 
testimony. 
Dr. Mendenhall testified that the wounds were 
dirty, and that such dirty wounds are consistent with 
hitting the asphalt pavement. (R. 1210.) That is really 
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the extent of Dr. Mendenhall's expert testimony. There is 
no testimony to separate which injuries were from hitting 
the train, and which injuries w£re from hitting the 
pavement. Indeed, there is no testimony as to what the 
injuries would have been if Gleave Had been wearing a seat 
belt. For all we know, his neck may have been broken if he 
had been wearing a seat belt. Of course, the doctor could 
not testify on any of those issues because he was a medical 
doctor—not a physicist or accident Reconstruction expert. 
A case in point is Heiser |v. Chastain, 285 N.E.2d 
601, 604 (111. App. 1972). There th^ court stated: 
However, we find a more ba^ic defect, is 
that the record fails to establish by 
competent evidence that the damages 
might have been mitigated i[f a seat belt 
had been used. [Citations omitted.] 
The only evidence relating!to this point 
is a statement by Donald Chastain that 
the space between the front and back 
seats of the cab was about 30 inches; 
testimony of plaintiff, Bertha Heiser, 
that when the cab hit the| car in front 
of it, she grabbed for something to hang 
onto because she felt thai: the cab was 
going to tip over, and she wanted to 
prevent being thrown from the seat; and 
a statement by Dr. Dennis Fancsali, 
plaintiff's examining physician, that if 
there was a force sufficient to cause a 
fracture from a blow, whether her trunk 
was immobilized or not would have little 
effect. This is insufficient to show 
that plaintiff's injuries would have 
been mitigated had she b^en wearing a 
seat belt, or to show the! extent which 
they would have been mitigated. 
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A similar result was reached in Bentzler v. Braun, 
149 N.W.2d 626, 641 (Wis. 1967), where the court stated: 
The only witness offered was an 
orthopedic surgeon, who, although 
qualified in his chosen profession, did 
not purport to be able to testify what 
effect the use of seat belts might have 
had in this particular case. The record 
supports the trial court's determination 
that there was no proof whatsoever to 
show that Janet Bentzler1s injuries were 
caused or aggravated by the failure to 
use the seat belts. In the absence of 
credible evidence by one qualified to 
express the opinion of how the use or 
nonuse of seat belts would have affected 
the particular injuries, it is improper 
for the court to permit the jury to 
speculate on the effect that seat belts 
would have had. 
E. Rio Grande's Failure to Plead the Seat Belt Defense. 
In any case, the seat belt defense was never 
pleaded. (R. 355, et seq.) Compare Rule 12(b) Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Gleave made a timely motion to preclude 
any expert testimony based on the failure to plead. 
(R. 1686-1691.) The court reserved its ruling. (R. 1691.) 
However, the issue never arose at trial because Rio Grande 
failed to introduce any expert testimony. Rio Grande failed 
to make any subsequent motion to amend pursuant to 
Rule 15(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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POINT VI. 
GLEAVE WAS ENTITLED Tp PRE-
JUDGMENT INTEREST ONL LOST 
EARNING CAPACITY. |7 
Utah statutes provide for prejudgment interest on 
special damages: 
In all actions brought to recover 
damages for personal injuries . . . it 
shall be lawful for plaintiff in the 
complaint to claim interest on special 
damages . . . and it shall be the duty 
of the Court in entering judgment for 
plaintiff in that action, io add to the 
amount of damages assesed bv the verdict 
of the jury . . . 8% per annum from the 
date of the occurrence of the act. 
Section 78-27-44, Utah) Code Ann. 
The jury answered special interrogatories as 
follows (R. 767): 
A. Past medical expenses 
Future medical expenses 
Past lost wages 
B. 
C. 
D. Loss of future earnings and 
earning capacity 
E. General damages to include 
pain and suffering and 
loss of enjoyment ofi life 
$ 56,000.00 
22,540.00 
20,000.00 
275,000.00 
50,000.00 
II 
- Points I to VI, above, are all in reply to Rio Grande's 
opening brief. However, Gleave ha[s cross-appealed on two 
issues—prejudgment interest and punitive damages. Points VII 
and VIII constitute Gleavefs opening points on the Cross-
Appeal. See this Court's Order of January 30, 1984, attached 
as Exhibit D. 
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F. Reasonable value of 
Robert Gleave's automobile 
on the date of the collision 1,600.00 
$425,140,00 
Based on this jury verdict, the trial judge 
allowed prejudgment interest on past lost wages and past 
medical expenses. (R. 802.) However, the court refused 
prejudgment interest on past lost wages (item D, above). 
Thus, the issue is whether lost earning capacity 
constitutes "special damages." If so, the statute should be 
followed. 
This issue was addressed in the case of Cohn v. 
J.C. Penney Company, Inc., 537 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1975). 
. . . [I]t is equally well settled 
that diminished earning capacity 
from a personal injury is special 
damages . . . . 
The policy of such prejudgment interest statutes 
is as follows: 
The purpose of awarding prejudgment 
interest is that money is worth less the 
later it is received. Therefore, in 
order to make a plaintiff whole, 
prejudgment interest is necessary to 
compensate plaintiff for the loss of the 
use of the money from the date of injury 
until the date of judgment. 
Conversely, prejudgment interest 
deprives a defendant of unjust enrich-
ment resulting from the use of money 
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which actually belongs to jthe plaintiff 
from the date of injury, thereby 
encouraging settlement. ! 
American Nat. Watermattress Corp. 
v. Manville, 642 P.jd 1330, 1343 
(Ala. 1982) . 
Thus, an award of prejudgment interest on Gleave's 
lost earning capacity would be with|in both the letter and 
the spirit of the Utah statute. 
POINT VII 
THE LOWER COURT ERI^ ED BY 
DISMISSING GLEAVEfS CLAIM 
FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
Gleave's Complaint included a claim for punitive 
damages. At the close of Gleave's direct case, the court 
dismissed the claim for punitive damages. Therefore, the 
punitive damage issue did not go t0 the jury. (R. 1355.) 
Gleave has cross-appealed on this is^ue. 
A. Factual Basis for Punitive Damages. 
The conditions of this grossing are extremely 
hazardous. (See Point I A, above.) 
This dangerous crossing was located on the 
outskirts of Springville. The crossing was used by the 
residents of one residential subdivision. (R. 1321.) 
Moreover, it appears that the crossing was in the middle of 
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a moderately built-up section of town and that the crossing 
o 
would, therefore, draw a moderate amount of traffic. 
Rio Grande was fully aware of this dangerous 
condition. To begin with, the railroad is inspected on a 
regular basis by employees of Rio Grande. (R. 1326.) 
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Indeed, the division engineer of Rio Grande traveled over 
that crossing between once each week and once each month for 
ten years. (R. 1329.) 
Finally, Rio Grande's agents met with officers of 
the State of Utah to inspect this very crossing in 1974. 
(R. 1236, 1237.) After that official inspection, it was 
recommended to install temporary stop signs until red 
flashing lights could be installed. (R. 1241.) 
B. Rio Grande's Failure to Take Remedial Steps. 
Notwithstanding the grave danger, Rio Grande 
continued to operate with absolute disregard for the safety 
of motorists. Rio Grande has no rules or regulations with 
respect to safety procedures for such blind crossings. 
(R. 1333.) For example, the railroad does not even consider 
— See Plaintiff's Exhibit 8. Defendant has claimed that 
the crossing was on an, "infrequently traveled, country 
road." (Brief of Appellant, at p. 4.) That statement is 
very misleading as it was based on a 1974 traffic count. 
(R. 1244.) As Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 shows, there has been 
an enormous buildup in that area over the past decade. 
— The Division Engineer is in charge of all the trackage, 
buildings and bridges. (R. 1328.) 
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blind crossings in setting train speeds, (R. 1334.) 
Indeed, Rio Grande has no rules or regulations or standards 
at all with respect to automobile safety at railroad 
crossings. (R. 1338.) 
The only protective measurie taken by Rio Grande 
was to provide a stop sign in 1979 or 1980. (R. 1323.) 
However, Rio Grande was put on notic^ that such a stop sign 
would not be effective. Specifically/ the Utah County 
Surveyor advised Rio Grande in 1976 t^ iat: 
Your suggestion for stop signs has 
been discussed by the County Commission 
and the Road Department. It was their 
feeling that the railroad c bmpany in the 
past, had been granted thp license to 
put these stop signs up at ^our expense. 
They see no reason to changb this policy 
and therefore this letter is your 
authority to put up stop 'signs if you 
care to do so. It is also [their feeling 
:hat very few people will pay any 
) th  
attention to them.Howevbr, it would 
place the responsibility on the driver 
if he violated the stop jsign and was 
involved in an accident 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 12|. 
[Emphasis added.] 
A jury could reasonably irifer from this evidence 
that Rio Grande acted in reckles^ disregard for human 
safety. Apparently, Rio Grande's s£>le purpose in placing 
the stop sign was to provide legal protection—and not to 
avoid accidents. 
This advice from the Uta^ h County Surveyor was 
consistent with administrative reguljations of the State of 
Utah: 
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Stop signs should not be installed 
indiscriminately at all unprotected 
crossings. The allowance of stop signs 
at all such crossings would eventually 
breed contempt for both law enforcement 
and disobedience to the sign's command 
stop. Stop signs may only be used at 
selected rail highway grade crossings 
after their need has been determined by 
a detailed traffic engineering study. 
Such studies should consider approach 
speeds, sight distance restrictions, 
volumes, accident records, etc. This 
application of stop signs should be an 
interim use period during which plans 
for lights, gates or other means of 
control are being prepared,, 
R. 1602. [Emphasis added.] 
The red flashing light recommended in 1974 
(R. 1241) , has never been installed! The "temporary" stop 
sign has existed for over a decade. 
C. Punitive Damages Railroad Crossing Cases 
from Foreign Jurisdictions. 
Foreign jurisdictions have not hesitated to allow 
punitive damages where railroads have carelessly maintained 
dangerous crossings. 
See; 
Poole v. Missouri Pacific R. R. Co., 
638 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1982); 
Hazelwood v. 111. Central Gulf R.R., 
450 N.E.2d 1199 (111. App. 1983); 
Brown v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 703 F.2d 
1050 (8th Cir. 1983); 
Matkovich v. Penn Central Transportation 
Co. , 431 N.E.2d 652 (Ohio 1982); 
Stromquist v. Burlington Northern Inc., 
444 N.E.2d 1113 (111. App. 1983); 
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Runkle v. Burlington Northern, 613 
P.2d 982 (Mont. 1980) ; 
Lowery v. Seabord Coastlinel R.R. Co., 
241 S.E.2d 158 (S. Cal. l|978) . 
J=S5££LJQJLC^ ^ 
The common theme in all of these cases is a 
"conscious disregard for public safety." Stromquist, id. at 
p. 1116. For example, Poole, id.| states the rule as 
follows: "The jury was entitled to infer that [the rail-
road] had knowledge of the potential danger . . . and that 
it was consciously indifferent to i^ he rights, welfare and 
safety of such persons affected by the danger." 
D. Utah Case Law on Punitive Damages, 
Utah has recently allowed punitive damages in a 
wide variety of circumstances: 
Branch v. Western Petroleum, 657 P.2d 
267 (Utah 1982) (pollution of culinary 
water); 
Leigh Furniture & Carpet Cd. v. Isom, 
657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) '(interference 
with contract); 
First Security Bank of Utah v, J.B.J. 
Feedyards, 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982) 
(wrongful attachment); 
Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.^d 37 (Utah 
1980) (sexual assault); 
Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 
1975) (property dispute) ,i 
Terry v» Z:*Tctfls Cooperative Mercantile 
Institution,iU 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979) 
(false arrest). 
— I t appears that this Court may have retreated from the 
imposition of punitive damages ±r|i false arrest cases. 
McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 
1984) . 
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In summary, this Court has permitted punitive 
damages for such problems as property disputes, interference 
with contract, wrongful attachment, water pollution, etc. 
Isn't it much more appropriate to impose punitive damages 
where human life and safety are involved? As this Court has 
stated: 
Furthermore, punitive damages should be 
awarded only when they will accomplish a 
public objective not accomplished by the 
award of compensatory damages . . . . 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital 
Corp., 675 P.2d 1179, 1187 (Utah 
1983) . 
It is clearly a public objective to save human lives at 
railroad crossings. 
E. Rio Grande Cannot Avoid Punitive Damages Because of the 
Preemption Argument. 
Rio Grande will probably argue that it had no 
power to install red flashing lights or other signal 
devices. (See Brief of Appellant, at Point III.) 
However, that is completely beside the point. 
Assume arquendo that the State of Utah has exclusive 
authority to install red lights« Rio Grande could, 
nonetheless, have reduced the speed of its trains. Rio 
Grande could, nonetheless, have burned away the weeds which 
obstructed vision. Other courts have allowed punitive 
damages under these same circumstances. 
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See: 
Runkle v. Burlington Northern, 613 P.2d 982 
(Mont. 1980)• (Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 
does not lessen in any way cominon law duties to make 
a safe crossing.) 
Stromquist v. Burlington Norther^, Inc., 444 N.E.2d 
1113 (111. App. 1983) . (Orders or proceedings of 
the Illinois Commerce Commission do not change 
railroad's common law duties.) 
Indeed, if the State of Utah has failed to install 
red flashing lights, Rio Grande has more reason to reduce 
train speed and burn away weeds. 
F. The Issue of Punitive Damages Can Be Tried Separately, 
and There is No Need to Retry th^ Liability Issues. 
Gleave has received a jury verdict that he is 0% 
negligent and that Ric Grande is 100% negligent. The 
preferred procedure is to affirm th&t verdict, and remand 
for the sole purpose of a new trial on punitive damages. 
See e.g., Fiberboard Paper Prod. Cor^. v. East Bay Union of 
Mach., 39 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1964), where the court stated: 
An appellate court has power to remand 
cases for retrial on a single issue such 
as damages (citations omitted), and this 
power includes a retrial oiji the limited 
issue of exemplary damages^ (citations 
omitted), id. at p. 100. 
See also, Olin Corp. v. Dyson, 678 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. App. 
1984); Alhino v. Starr, 169 Cal. Rptr,. 136; 112 Cal. App. 3d 
158 (1981); Rosner v« Sears Roebuck, L68 Cal. Rptr. 237; 110 
Cal. App. 3d 740 (1980) . 
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Indeed, it is not uncommon to bifurcate the issues 
of compensatory damages and punitive damages. Rupert v. 
Sellers, 368 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1975); James P. Vollertson 
Assts., Inc. v. John Nothnagle, Inc., 369 N.Y.S.2d 267 
(1975); Newton v. Yates, 353 N.E.2d 485 (Ind. App. 1976); 
Chupp v. Henderson, 216 S.E.2d 366 (Ga. 1975). See also, 
Punitive Damages Law & Practice, Callaghan 1984 ed., § 
12.04. If the punitive damage claim can be bifurcated into 
a separate trial, it follows a. priori that remand for a 
trial on the limited issue of punitive damages would be 
appropriate. 
POINT VIII. 
GLEAVE SHOULD NOT BE DRAGGED INTO 
ANY DISPUTE (ON CONTRIBUTION) BE-
TWEEN RIO GRANDE AND THE STATE OF 
UTAH. 
Rio Grande claims that the State of Utah was 
improperly dismissed. Rio Grande claims that a trial is 
necessary to determine the relative fault between Rio Grande 
and the State of Utah. (See Brief of Appellant at p. 49.) 
The State of Utah and Rio Grande are 
joint tort-feasors. Gleave (the injured party) may sue 
whichever tort-feasor he chooses; and Gleave can collect the 
entire judgment from either tort-feasor: 
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When there is a disproportion of 
fault among joint tort-feasors to an 
extent that it would rendejr inequitable 
an equal distribution by contribution 
among them of their common liability, 
the relative degrees of [fault of the 
joint tort-feasors shall he considered 
in determining their pro rata shares, 
solely for the purpose of determining 
their rights of contribution among 
themselves, each remaining severally 
liable to the injured petson for the 
whole injury as at common law. 
Section 78-27-40(2), ijtah Code Ann. 
• * * 
Nothing in this act shall effect: 
(1) The common-law liability of the 
several joint tort-feasors to have 
judgment recovered, and payment made, 
from them individually by the injured 
person for the whole injury. 
Section 78-27-41(1) Utjah Code Ann. 
After Gleave (the injured #arty) recovers from Rio 
Grande (a joint tort-feasor), Rio Grfende has a right to sue 
the State of Utah for contribution: 
The right of contribution shall 
exist among joint tort-fdasors, but a 
joint tort-feasor shall not be entitled 
to a money judgment for contribution 
until he has, by payment, discharged the 
common liability or mo^ re than his 
pro rata share thereof. 
Section 78-27-39, Utaljt Code Ann. 
Note that Rio Grande does not have any right of 
contribution until after payment of! the original judgment. 
Thus, Rio Grande should first pay the judgment against 
Gleave. Thereafter, Rio Grande cani pursue its claims for 
contribution against the State of Ut^h. 
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Rio Grande now wants to drag Gleave back into a 
three-way retrial (Gleave/Rio Grande/State of Utah). Rio 
Grande relies on Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.
 y 
679 P.2d 903 (Utah 1984) . 
However, Jensen deals with a different issue and 
is inapposite in this case. Note especially that a jury has 
already decided that Gleave is 0% negligent. What remains 
is only the dispute between Rio Grande and the State of Utah 
with respect to dividing the 100% fault. That can be done 
by a separate trial on contribution. See Unigard Insurance 
Company v. City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344 (Ut. 1984). 
CONCLUSION 
The jury verdict should be affirmed. This Court 
should remand for two limited purposes: First, to assess 
prejudgment interest on lost earning capacity. Second, for 
a trial on the issue of punitive damages. 
If Rio Grande has any claim for contribution from 
the State of Utah, that should be resolved in a separate 
trial between the two tort-feasors. 
Respectfully submitted, this & day of 
^ ^ / . 1985. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent and Cross-
Appellan£>>Robert L. gleave 
By: 
ROBERT J. -DEBRY 
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Cross-Appellant Robert L. Gleave, (Gleave vs. Rio Grande, 
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Exhibit A 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84117 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TJHE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COjUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. GLEAVE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT J. 
) DEBRY IN OPPOSITION TO 
) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
) A NEW TRIAL 
DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN 
RAILROAD COMPANY, a Utah Civil No. 62912 
corporation, UTAH RAILWAY 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, ) 
J (Judge Cullen Y. Christens* 
Defendants. ) 
)| 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
My name is Robert J. peBry. I give the following 
testimony under oath: 
1. During the voir dire, the Court asked for a 
list of witnesses; 
2. I read a partial fListing of witnesses; 
3. Some time thereafter, (but during the voir 
dire) my legal assistant, Deann4 Richards, reminded me that 
I had skipped the name of Dr* Mendenhall. I thereupon 
advised the Court and the venire of Dr. Mendenhallfs name. 
4. x read the partxal transcript of the voir 
aire prepared by Mr. Roundy. The colloquay regarding Dr. 
Mendenhaii was not included. I thereupon called Mr. Roundy 
re order a complete copy of the voir dire. 
5. Mr. Roundy informed me that he had only taken 
£es on a portion of the voir dire. 
^ DATED this /j day 1984. 
ROBE 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /j/~ £ay 
J^UUc*X> 1984, 
6<J^ 
My Commssion Expires; 
NOTARY BOBLICy . S\ 
Residing at; >ddM: >AJCL Ut^,±^UhL 
i 
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Exhibit B 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
REGARDING JURY SELECTION 
Rio Grande claims that therfc was error in the jury 
selection with respect to juror Arcjryle. Gleave contends 
that there is no record to support such claims. In the 
absence of a complete record, this Cburt should affirm the 
verdict. (See Point II of main brief[) 
However, this Court might be inclined to look 
beyond the procedural defect to examine the merits. Since 
it is not likely that this Court will reach the merits, this 
memorandum is included only as an appfendix. 
POINT ONE. 
DR. MENDENHALL WAS INTRODUCED 
DURING OPENING STATEMENTS. 
Rio Grande complains that hr. Mendenhall was not 
introduced during the voir dire. tiven if that is true, 
Dr. Mendenhall was introduced to th|e jury during opening 
statements: 
Doctor Mendenhall, an ortho-
pedic doctor, will cofne in to 
describe those injuries, but just 
briefly let me explain the nature of 
his injuries . . . . 
(R. 1705.) 
Rio Grande could easily have objected at the time 
of the opening statement. At that early stage of the 
trial, the Court had various alternatives to cure the error. 
However, Rio Grande did not object. Instead, Rio Grande 
waited to see what type of verdict it would get. Now, after 
the fact, Rio Grande complains. However it is too late. 
The error, if any, has been waived. Coke v. Timby, 19 2 P. 
624 (Utah 1920); White v. Newman, 348 P.2d 343 (Utah 1960). 
POINT TWO. 
RIO GRANDE RELIED ON DR. 
MENDENHALL'S ANTICIPATED 
TESTIMONY. 
Rio Grande was fully informed about Dr. Menden-
hall's role in the trial. Indeed, Rio Grande had taken 
Dr. Mendenhall's deposition. Prior to the opening 
statements, defendant argued certain motions to the Court. 
Those motions were based in part on Dr. Mendenhall's 
anticipated testimony: 
MR. O'HARA: [Arguing for Rio Grande] 
And the doctor in this case will testify 
that there was substantial dirt and 
splinters, that sort of thing, in the 
man's—Mr. Gleave's leg and elbow and 
knee and ankle. 
(R. 1688.) 
— A correct objection would be something like this: 
Defendant objects to any comment 
regarding testimony from a witness who 
was not introduced on voir dire. 
Defendant will further move to exclude 
the testimony of Dr. Mendenhall if and 
when that is offered. 
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Thus, on one hand, Rio Grande relies on 
Dr. Mendenhall1s expected testimony its own motions. On 
the other hand, Rio Grande complains that no one knew about 
Dr. Mendenhall. That is simply not f|air. Rio Grande cannot 
have it both ways! 
POINT THREE. 
DR. MENDENHALL'S TESTIMONY 
WAS UNCONTRADICTED. 
Dr. Mendenhall's testimony was completely 
uncontradicted. Dr. Mendenhall siimply described the 
injuries. The injuries were essentially broken bones. 
There was certainly no claim that th^ bones were not really 
broken! In a very similar case, this Court has held that 
there was no showing of bias: 
After being returned to their 
families by another camper in the area, 
the girls were taken to the| Brigham City 
Hospital where they were examined by 
Dr. David Carlquist. At trial 
Dr. Carlquist testified [as to his 
examination]. 
* * * 
This appeal focuses Solely on the 
voir dire examination. One of the 
veniremen . . . indicated tjiat he 
was acquainted with . . . 
Dr. Carlquist . . . . 
* * * 
The trial judge concluded that [the 
juror's] impressions of -qhe witnesses 
were not so "strong and deep" as to 
constitute bias. Although it may have 
been better to have excused [the juror] 
3 
for cause, we find no error in leaving 
him on the panel. This is particularly 
so when the nature of the testimony 
offered by Carlquist . . . is 
considered. Their credibility was not 
questioned and their testimony is not 
crucial to the prosecutor's case. 
State v. Lacey, 665 P.2d 1311 
(Utah 1983); 
See also: Woodring v. U.S., 
376 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1967); 
Lamphere v. Agnew, 607 P.2d 1164 
(N.M. 1975). 
The Oregon Supreme Court has considered a case 
identical to this one. Bradlev v. Gudeman, 543 P. 2d 1045 
(Or. 1975) . In Bradley, the Court held that paintiff did 
not have the sole duty to introduce witnesses to the jury. 
Thusf nothing stopped Rio Grande from introducing 
Dr. Mendenhall to the prospective jurors . Nothing stopped 
Rio Grande from asking questions about Dr. Mendenhall during 
the voir dire. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court was correct in ruling that a new 
trial was not required because of juror Argyle. 
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Exhibit C 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM REGARDING 
STATE PREEMPTION SIGNS AND SIGNALS 
AT RAILROAD CROSSES. 
Rio Grande's memorandum argues that the State of 
Utah has exclusive jurisdiction (preemption) over signs and 
signals at railroad crossings, 
Gleave has responded that! these issues may be 
resolved on procedural grounds. See Point III of main 
brief. However, this Court might be inclined to look beyond 
the procedural defect to examine th£ merits. Since it is 
not likely that the Court will even reach the merits, this 
memorandum is included only as an appendix. 
POINT ONE. 
ANY ERROR IN THE TJRIAL 
COURT IS MOOT. 
There was indeed an error in the trial court. 
However, that error favored Rio Grande. The trial court 
erred by refusing to instruct the juify that Rio Grande had a 
common law duty to install appropriate safety signals at the 
railroad crossing. (R. 1901-1903.) The other side of the 
coin is that the Court erred by instructing the jury that 
the State of Utah had exclusive 4uty to install safety 
signals at the railroad crossing. (R. 737.) The trial 
court apparently believed that the diity for signs and 
signals had to fall either on the State of Utah or Rio 
Grande. The trial court failed to consider the possibility 
that the duties were overlapping. 
However the error is moot. It really makes no 
difference whether Rio Grande or the State of Utah had the 
duty to install signs and signals at the crossing because 
that issue was never presented to the jury. The issue 
presented to the jury was whether Rio Grande violated any 
duties other than the duty to install signs and signals at 
crossings. Thus, the judge instructed the jury as follows: 
Under Utah law the ultimate 
determination regarding right of way and 
crossing design and crossing warning and 
safety devices is placed under the 
control of the Utah Department of 
Transportation. You may not therefore 
find either defendant railroad negligent 
based upon any defects which might exist 
with respect to the design of the 
1600 South crossing or based upon any 
problems you may perceive in the lack of 
traffic warning devices at the 
1600 South crossing. 
However, irrespective of the 
foregoing, the defendant Denver & Rio 
Grande Western Railroad is not relieved 
of any responsibility to exercise due 
care when its trains approach such 
crossing. Consequently, if you find 
that the configuration of the land and 
other physical features in the area make 
such crossing more than ordinarily 
hazardous and that the warning devices 
employed at the crossing were inadequate 
to warn the public of the danger, you 
shall determine whether the defendant 
Denver & Rio grande Western Railroad 
knew of or should have known of such 
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condition and whether it exercised due 
care in view of all the circumstances. 
The failure to exercise du|e care under 
such conditions would constitute 
negligence. 
(R. 737.) 
Therefore, it makes no difference how the trial 
court ruled on the issue of signs &nd signals. The jury 
decided that Rio Grande violated duties other than the duty 
to install signs and signals. 
POINT TWO. 
THE DUTIES OF THE SfTATE OF 
UTAH AND RIO GRANDE OVERLAP. 
A* The Common Law Background; 
Utah has always held that railroads have common 
law duties to make safe crossings. Hobbs v. Denver & Rio 
Grande Western R.R., 677 P.2d 1128 (0tah 1984); Bridges v. 
Union Pacific R.R. Co., 488 P.2d 738 26 Utah 2d 281, (1971); 
Evans v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 37 Utah 431, 108 P. 638 
(1910); English v. Southern Pac. Co.b 13 Utah 407, 45 P. 47 
(1896) . 
Further, it is generally conceded that trains have 
a common law duty to operate at a reasonable speed. Denvers 
v. Southern Pac. Co., 171 P. 949, 1000 (Utah 1918); 
St. Louis Southwestern R.R. Co. v. feenningtons, 553 S.W.2d 
436 (Ark. 1977); Runkle v. Burlingtoii Northern, 613 P.2d 982 
(Mont. 1980) . 
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B. The Statutory Background: 
In addition to the common law, the legislature has 
imposed a variety of duties on railroads. Section 56-1-11, 
Utah Code Ann, (1953) , provides that: 
Every railroad company shcill be liable 
for damages caused by its neglect to 
make and maintain good and sufficient 
crossings at points where any line of 
travel crosses its road. 
Section 41-6-19, Utah Code Ann., requires 
landowners (including railroads) to take certain precautions 
for motorists: 
It shall be the duty of the owner of 
real property to remove from such 
property any tree, plant, shrub or other 
obstruction, or part thereof, which, by 
obstructing the view of any driver, 
constitutes a traffic hazard. 
Section 41-6-95(3), Utah Code Ann., provides that 
a motorist must stop at a crossing if: 
A railroad train approaching within 
approximately 1,500 feet of the highway 
crossing emits a signal audible from 
such distance . . . . 
— It is uncontested that a major danger with this 
crossing was the weeds growing on Rio Grande property. 
These weeds severely restricted a motorist's ability to see 
an oncoming train. (See Brief of Appellant, at p. 4. 
Compare plaintiff's exhibits 2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, 2G, and 2L. 
See also, R. 1597. 
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Finally, Section 56-1-14, U|bah Code Ann. , requires 
trains to give an advance audible warhing: 
Every locomotive shall be provided with 
a bell which shall be rung! continuously 
from a point not less than eighty rods 
from any . . . public highway grade 
crossing . . . the sounding of the 
locomotive whistle or siren at least 
one-fourth of a mile before! reaching any 
grade crossing shall be deemed the 
equivalent of ringing the b^ll . . . . 
C. Overlapping Duties. 
As noted above, Utah has a rich background of 
common law and statutory safeguards that apply to railroad 
crossings. Rio Grande urges that ajll of those safeguards 
have been wiped out by virtue of Section 54-4-15, Utah Code 
Ann. See Brief of Appellant, at Poirit III C. 
Gleave does not contest tljat the Utah Department 
of Transportation has some authority. However, the Utah 
Department of Transportation's authority is not exclusive. 
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It overlaps with Rio Grande's common law duties, and with 
other statutory duties: 
Section 54-4-15(2), Utah Cqde Ann., prior to 1975, 
provided that the UPSC has "exclusivd power" to regulate and 
prescribe "the terms of installation,! operation, maintenance, 
use and protection of each crossing . . . a public road or 
highway by a railroad . . . " (Emphasis added.) 
2/ 
— There is no evidence in this (record that Rio Grande 
ever requested permission to install! gates or lights at the 
crossing. Nor, is there any evidenc4 that the State of Utah 
denied Rio Grande permission to install gates or lights at 
the crossing. 
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In 1975, Section 54-4-15(2) was amended to insert 
the Utah Department of Transportation in place of the Utah 
Public Service Commission. Also, the amendment removed the 
word "exclusive" from the grant of power given in the 
statute. Instead, the U.P.S.C. was given the "exclusive 
jurisdiction," by §54-4-15(4), Utah Code Ann., to resolve 
disputes between the U.D.O.T. and person aggrieved by any 
action of the U.D.O.T. 
Other states have construed such regulatory 
schemes as follows: 
Runkle v. Burlington Northern, 613 P.2d 982 
(Mont. 1980) . (Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 
does not lessen in any way railroad's common law 
duties to make a safe crossing. 
Hines v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 330 N.W.2d 
284 (Iowa 1983) . (State statutes setting 
standards for railroad crossing safety do not 
change or abrogate railroad's common law 
duties.) 
Stromquist v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 444 
N.E.2d 1113 (111. App. 1983). (Orders or 
proceedings of Illinois Commerce Comm. do not 
abrogate the railroad's common law duties.) 
POINT THREE. 
THE STATUTE SHOULD NOT BE 
CONSTRUED IN A MANNER WHICH 
WOULD ABROGATE COMMON LAW 
DUTIES. 
If the legislature wanted to preempt all existing 
common law, it should have said so. Statutes will not be 
construed to change the common law unless the language is 
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clear and explicit. See e.g., City <pf Pensacola v. Capitol 
Realty Holding Co. , 471 So.2d 687 (Fl|a. App. 1982): 
(A statute designed to change the common 
law must be in clear and unequivocal 
terms, for the presumption is that no 
change in the common law is intended 
unless the statute is explicit in that 
regard.) 
State v. Stovall, 648 P.2d 543 (Wyo. 1982): 
(A statute designed to change the common 
law must speak in clear anid unequivocal 
terms as there is a presumbtion that no 
change is intended unless tfhe statute is 
explicit.) 
United States v. Bellard, 674 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1982). 
If a common law right is td be taken 
away, it must be noted clearly by 
the legislature. 
POINT FOUR. 
RIO GRANDE'S THEORY ON APPEAL NOT 
PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
On appeal, Rio Grande now argues a new theory 
never presented to the trial court. In the trial court, Rio 
Grande did ask for a ruling that the issue of signs and 
signals was preempted to the State !of Utah. In fact, Rio 
Grande won that round. However, Rio Grande did not go the 
next step to claim that the duty of reducing speed or 
burning weeds was somehow preempted by the State of Utah. 
See Brief of Appellant, at pp. 35-364 
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Since the issue was not preserved in the trial 
3 
court, it may not be raised for the first time on appeal. 
See, e.g., Combe v. Warrenfs Family Drive-Inns
 y Inc., 680 
P.2d 773 (Utah 1984); County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83 (Utah 
1983); Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983); 
Turtle Mgt. Inc. v. Haggis Mgt. Inc., 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 
1982). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court was correct in denying the motion 
for summary judgment. 
— Even if the issue was presented on the motion for 
partial summary judgment, it was waived when Rio Grande 
failed to renew the theory at trial. It would have been 
especially appropriate to renew the theory at trial because 
the trial court did grant a directed verdict on this very 
issue. (R. 737.) 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
E. Scott Savage 
Michael F. Richman 
Patrick J. O'Hara 
Attorneys for The Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company and Utah 
Railway Company 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. GLEAVE, 
°0A 
* 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
and Respondent, 
vs 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, UTAH RAILWAY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant-Appellants 
and Respondents 
and 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
STIPULATION AND ORDER 
CONSOLIDATING APPEALS & 
ESTABLISHING BRIEFING 
SCHEDULE 
(Case No. 20166) 
(Case No. 20300) 
Consolidated Case No. 20300 
PROCEDURAL STATEMENT 
1. Before final Judgment was entered by the District 
Court in this action, plaintiff filed 4 Notice of Appeal on or 
about August 28, 1984. After the District Court entered final 
judgment, Plaintiff filed a Renewed Notice of Appeal on or 
about November 1, 1984, resulting in Supreme Court Case No. 
20166. Robert L. Gleave ("Gleave") appeals from a directed 
verdict entered against Gleave on Gleave's claim for punitive 
damages. 
2. After the District Court entered final judgment 
in this action, Defendants The Denver and Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Company (the "Rio Grande") and Utah Railway Company 
("Utah Railway") filed a Notice of Appeal on or about November 
9, 1984, resulting in Supreme Court Case No. 20300. The Rio 
Grande and Utah Railway appeal from the judgment entered 
against said defendants based on a jury verdict adverse to said 
defendants. 
STIPULATION 
It is stipulated by the undersigned counsel of record 
as follows: * 
1. The appeal docketed by Gleave (i.e., Supreme 
Court Case No. 20166) may be consolidated with the appeal filed 
by the Rio Grande and Utah Railway (i.e., Supreme Court Case 
No. 20300), so that both appeals may be heard as part of Case 
No. 20300. 
2. Within 30 days after the record on appeal is 
filed in the Supreme Court, the Rio Grande and Utah Railway 
shall file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court its Brief on 
appeal. 
3. Within 30 days after service upon Gleave and 
State of Utah, Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") of 
-2-
the Brief filed by the Rio Grande and Utah Railway, Gleave and 
UDOT shall file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court their 
respective Briefs, provided that Gleavje and UDOT shall have 33 
days if the Rio Grande's and Utah Railway's Brief is served on 
Gleave and UDOT by mail. 
4. After Gleave and UDOT file their respective 
Briefs, the Rio Grande and Utah Railway may serve a Reply Brief 
within 30 days after service by Gleavei and UDOT of their 
respective Briefs on the Rio Grande an|d Utah Railway, provided 
that the Rio Grande shall have 33 days| if Gleavefs or UDOT's 
Brief is served on the Rio Grande by n^ ail. The Reply Brief 
filed by the Rio Grande and Utah Railv^ ay, if any, shall be 
limited to answering any new matter s^ t forth in the Briefs 
filed by Gleave and UDOT. 
5. If the Rio Grande and Utah Railway file a Reply 
Brief to Gleavefs Brief, then Gleave n}ay thereafter file a 
Surreply Brief limited exclusively to the portion of the Rio 
Grande's and Utah Railway's Reply Bri^f which pertains to 
Gleave's contention that it was error for the District Court to 
grant the Rio Grande's and Utah Railway's motion for a directed 
verdict on the question of Gleave's c]|aim for punitive 
damages. The Surreply Brief filed by Gleave, if any, shall be 
limited to answering any new matter s^ t forth in the Rio 
Grande's and Utah Railway's Reply Bri^f on the issue of 
punitive damages. Any Surreply Brief filed by Gleave on the 
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punitive damages issue must be filed by Gleave within 30 days 
after service by the Rio Grande and Utah Railway of their Reply 
Brief on Gleave, provided that Gleave shall have 33 days if the 
Rio Grande's and Utah Railway's Reply Brief if served on Gleave 
by mail, 
DATED t h i s j ^ J d a y of December, 1984. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
E. Scott Savage 
Michael F. Richman 
Patrick J. O'Hara 
DATED this 
»?d&XQL, 
Attorneys for The Denver and 
Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. 
and Utah Railway Company 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
DATED this V. day of A ALL. 19 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
day of 
Attorney for Robert/ L. Gleave 
_> 19 
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
By 
Paul M. Warner, Assistant 
Attorney General, Attorney for 
The State of Utah, Utah 
Department of Transportation. 
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ORDER 
Based on the foregoing stipulation by the parties, it 
IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Supreme Court Case No. 2(^ 166 is hereby 
consolidated with Supreme Court Case N<^ . 20300, with the 
surviving case number of the consolidated case being Supreme 
Court Case No. 20300. 
2. The briefing schedule stipulated by the parties 
at Paragraph 2 through 5 of the foregoing Stipulation is hereby 
incorporated by reference and made binding upon the parties as 
an Order of the Court. 
DATED this day of January, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
Justice of the Supreme Court 
28970 
122884 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing "Stipulation and Order Consolidating Appeals and 
Establishing Briefing Schedule" was mailed, postage prepaid, 
this day of , 19 to:: 
Robert J. DeBry 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Paul Warner, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General for the 
State of Utah 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
Utah Department of Transportation, 
State of Utah 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
28970 
122884 
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